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COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE IN THE 
RESTRUCTURED ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 
Charles H. Koch, Jr.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Electricity deregulation has been managed by the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"), but FERC allowed the 
industry to evolve the organizations for accomplishing it.1 
Deregulation of electricity required the vertical unbundling of the 
integrated utilities which had unified all the industry segments 
from generation to distribution. Thus, the major firms that held the 
industry together are disappearing, and the system is seeking a 
structure to fill the governance void those firms leave behind. After 
considerable experimentation, the emerging model is the Regional 
Transmission Organization ("RTO"), a not-for-profit authority that 
acquires electricity and transmits it for distribution. Because they 
sit astride the whole system, the RTOs' governance determines both 
the capabilities of the system and the fair treatment of all those it 
affects (which, given the nature of electricity in modern society, 
ultimately means everyone).2 
A. Collaborative Governance 
Obviously, the emerging electricity industry is inherently a 
collaborative enterprise. Therefore, the principles of "collaborative 
* Dudley W. Woodbridge Professor of Law, William and Mary School of 
Law. B.A., University of Maryland, 1966; J.D., George Washington University, 
1969; LL.M., University of Chicago, 1975. 
1. FERC took the wise course of evolving frameworks for the development 
of a restructured industry rather than dictating specific forms. The framework 
for restructuring was established by Order 888, Promoting Wholesale 
Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services 
by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and 
Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 1996) (to be codified at 18 
C.F.R. pts. 35, 385) [hereinafter Order 888]. The main framework for the 
development of transmission organizations, which is particularly relevant to 
this Article, was provided by Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 810 (Jan. 6, 2000) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Order 
2000]. 
2. A history of electricity restructuring can be found in RICHARD F. HIRsH, 
POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN THE 
AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM (1999). 
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governance," developed largely by Jody Freeman, offer guidance for 
these new public/private institutions. 3 Collaborative governance 
seeks to reorient the conceptualization of administrative process 
around techniques of joint problem solving and controlled 
discretion.4 It seeks an alternative to adversarial government and 
explores concepts and processes which might replace interest group 
contests with cooperation and dialogue.5 The principles of 
collaborative governance seem to speak directly to the evolving 
electricity industry. For one thing, as Professor Freeman observed, 
"[a] collaborative perspective requires that we reconceive the 
relationships and responsibilities among public and private actors in 
the regulatory process."6 Collaborative governance offers more in 
that it fosters the development of a coherent theoretic framework for 
those experimenting with alternatives to contest and coercive action. 
Collaborative governance is characterized by five features: 
1. A positive problem-solving orientation; 
2. Broad participation by interested and affected persons at 
all stages of the decision-making process; 
3. Solutions that are provisional and subject to revision 
(plasticity); 
4. Accountability; and 
5. Synergistic, flexible, and engaged government 
institutions. 7 
The first feature exults positive problem solving rather than 
contestability, compelled information sharing, and deliberation. The 
second feature, broad participation, has the normative goal of 
independent, democratic policymaking and the instrumental goal of 
effective problem solving. The third feature, plasticity, seeks 
3. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 
45 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1997) [hereinafter Freeman, Collaborative Governance]; 
Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARv. 
L. REv. 1285 (2003); see also Sallyanne Payton, Professionalism as Third-Party 
Governance: The Function and Dysfunction of Medicare, in MAKING 
GoVERNMENT MANAGEABLE: EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT IN THE 
TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY 112 (Thomas H. Stanton & Benjamin Ginsberg eds., 
2004). Professor Payton has, for years, explored this concept in her course "Law 
of Cooperative Federalism" at the University of Michigan Law School. 
4. Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 3, at 22. 
5. Americans, not just their lawyers, have a great deal of difficulty with 
such behavioral norms. Much of the rest of the world finds it easier to engage 
in community-regarding dispute resolution. Our instinctive competitiveness is 
our strength and our weakness. Here, as perhaps elsewhere, this instinct can 
inhibit the attainment of the ultimate goal. Our inability to engage in 
cooperative decision making may accrue to our comparative disadvantage in the 
increasingly interconnected world. 
6. Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 3, at 95. 
7. Id. at 22. 
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evolutionary decision making in which solutions to immediate 
problems do not foreclose rethinking of both solutions and goals. 
The fourth feature, accountability, undertakes new arrangements in 
which parties are interdependent and accountable to each other. 
The last feature, synergistic government, envisions coordinated 
roles for public agencies, such as serving as facilitators and 
information clearinghouses. While government may guide and 
monitor performance, it does not dictate operations. 
The whole package adds up to a strategy of cooperative decision 
making. Understanding cooperative decision making among 
numerous diverse interests is advanced by Jim Rossi's insight that, 
even though classic governance strategies exult participation over 
all other values, the central consideration must be optimizing 
deliberation.8 Cooperative decision making, while valuing 
participation, must ultimately serve deliberative goals. 
Participation can establish an appearance of fairness but, in terms 
of effective decision making, has a diminishing marginal utility to 
the point of disutility. Focusing on effective and fair deliberation, 
rather than the contributory value of participation, effectuates 
cooperative decision making. 
The collaborative governance package, applied to effective and 
fair deliberation, and ultimately decision making, will enhance 
governance in the electricity industry. The electricity industry 
requires more sophisticated thinking about these principles. A more 
collaborative, problem-solving goal for electricity governance will 
change the conceptualization of the interaction among the interests. 
Careful attention to the instrumental value of participation, as well 
as its normative value, is nowhere more important than in 
electricity governance. Applying this thinking, this Article seeks a 
governance model that will better serve problem solving and satisfy 
all the various interests that are involved in the substance as well 
as the form of governance. 
Collaborative governance contemplates a system of optimum 
deliberation in the context of shared fundamental goals. The 
breakdown of the electricity market in California is example enough 
of the calamity of unrestrained self-interest in the interrelated 
electricity environment and the damage it can do even to those 
attempting to advance self-aggrandizing interests. In the short run, 
and certainly in the long run, all are served by assuring the best 
possible electricity system. Electricity governance is a complex 
prisoners' dilemma in which individual self-interest may in fact 
diminish the payoff for everyone, unlike most business relationships 
in which competition has social value. Mutual trust is obviously not 
enough; hence, positive governance is necessary. The governance 
8. Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for 
Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173 (1997) [hereinafter 
Rossi, Participation Run Amok]. 
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structure must be effective and fair and also appear to be effective 
and fair. This Article makes a few suggestions as to how to achieve 
this governance goal. 
B. The Emerging Governance Model 
Fortunately, FERC has allowed restructuring to evolve rather 
than attempting to command any particular model. This process 
has provided experimentation and variety, but a general model is 
emerging. The emerging RTO governance model seems 
fundamentally sound, and improvements can build on this base. 
These improvements should enhance access and involvement for all 
interests. The model has attempted to assure participation by the 
various interests, but it may not afford equal and actual influence 
for all interests. The major obstacles are unequal expertise among 
the interest groups and the cultural norms established during the 
era of integrated utilities. Recommended are RTO-constituted and 
-supported "representative" committees, representing certain 
interests likely to be disadvantaged in presenting their views to the 
governing body. 
Also recommended is a reconstitution of state and local energy 
authorities from second-tier and increasingly irrelevant regulatory 
entities to independent and well-armed protectors of these 
disadvantaged interests (in particular). At present, state and local 
energy authorities are slowly, and probably unintentionally, being 
co-opted by the RTOs. That is, while bringing state and local energy 
authorities into governance, the RTOs are actually turning them 
into nonentities. The public authorities should resist this pull and 
stay independent of the RTOs. So constituted, local authorities can 
find ways to help represent the public. They have the expertise and 
the established stature, and hopefully they will retain the resources 
to compensate for the advantages industry insiders have over other 
affected interests. 
II. EMERGING GoVERNANCE MODELS IN ELECTRICITY 
RESTRUCTURING 
A. Industry Context 
Even for the readers of an electricity symposium, a description 
of the recent evolution of the electricity industry is necessary to 
focus on the governance questions.9 In the former regime, electricity 
was delivered largely by integrated firms that supplied generation, 
transmission, distribution, and various ancillary services.10 The 
9. A good basic overview of the industry and the challenges facing it is 
PETER FOX-PENNER, ELECTRIC UTILITY RESTRUCTURING: A GUIDE TO THE 
COMPETITIVE ERA (1997). 
10. See JefferyS. Dennis, Federalism, Electric Industry Restructuring, and 
the Dormant Commerce Clause: Tampa Electric Co. v. Garcia and State 
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integrated firm was a highly efficient organization that delivered 
reliable power at an acceptable price. Of course, integrated firms 
were built around geographic monopolies, with the defects that 
monopolies conjure up. Perceived failures of the regulation of these 
monopolies, rather than breakdowns in performance, led to 
deregulation. Restructuring started with the "unbundling'' of three 
obviously related, but separate, segments of electricity production 
and delivery: generation, transmission, and distribution. Markets 
developed, with varying degrees of success, in generation and 
distribution, but a market structure for transmission has not been 
successfully implemented. Because transmission has defied pure 
market solutions, organizing the new industry has proven extremely 
difficult, belying simplistic pure market solutions. Yet, 
transmission sits astride the industry, connecting generation with 
distribution and other marketing processes, and market failures in 
transmission replicate the market failures of the old system that 
resulted in regulatory solutions. 
The current model emerged from the existing transmission 
operation. Each integrated system had a central authority that 
directed the flow of electricity. The generation, transmission, and 
distribution segments in those systems were necessarily controlled 
by such central offices. Therefore, the technical operation of the 
electricity grid necessarily created a core operating authority. The 
office performing these technical transmission operations, the 
"system operator," naturally transformed into the managing entity 
of each electricity system. Before restructuring, the system operator 
ran the system through command. Thus, the system operator could 
command the operation of the generators in the integrated system 
based on the demand or expected demand communicated by the 
distribution segment. With restructuring, the operation has moved 
from intrafirm management to interfirm leadership of some 
variation on a market.11 
B. Examples of RTO Governance Processes 
Various organizations were proposed and experimented with, 
but in the end one archetypical organization emerged: the 
Independent System Operator ("ISO"). The ISO emerged from the 
technical manager of the former vertically integrated electric power 
system. Because it had to retain many of the monopolist aspects of 
Restrictions on the Development of Merchant Power Plants, 43 NAT. RESOURCES 
J. 615, 622-23 (2003). 
11. A recent study ofthe electricity industry found that both integrated and 
nonintegrated models had governance advantages and disadvantages. Magali 
Delmas & Yesim Tokat, Deregulation Process, Governance Structures and 
Efficiency: The U.S. Electric Utility Sector, at http://www.ucei.berkeley.edu/ 
PDF/EPE_004.pdf(Univ. of Cal. Energy Inst. Working Paper Series, Mar. 2003) 
(finding that integrated firms offered stability through insulation and 
nonintegrated firms adapted better to new environments). 
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the old regime, the system operator needed to be independent in 
order to avoid monopolistic behavior.12 The governance required 
special attention to structuring the central (ostensible) transmission 
authority to assure independence. Hence, governance strategies 
were and are the root of independence in the independent system 
operator. Assuring this independence required effective 
involvement of all interests from industry members to customers. 
Because ISOs linked all the factors of electricity production and 
distribution, their governance emerged as the key to an effective and 
nondiscriminatory electricity system. Generally, it has also led to 
ISOs being operated as not-for-profit entities.13 
The industry's geography changed as well. The markets of the 
integrated utilities were "assigned" along state boundaries. For 
largely regulatory reasons, each state was an isolated electricity 
system. While this was never totally true because the systems had 
limited interconnection for emergencies and ownership was not 
limited by states, restructuring brought extensive, rather than just 
incidental, interstate interconnection. The transmission systems, 
and thereby whole integrated systems, became interstate. 
Therefore, the model that emerged was the RTO, the number and 
range of which have continued to evolve. The shift from state-
defined entities to regional entities has governance implications, 
both in structuring the core entity and in transforming the role of 
state and local energy authorities. In addition, RTOs have 
increasingly taken on some international aspects. (Already, 
cooperation among U.S., Canadian, and Mexican systems has 
become a feature of the North American electricity industry, and 
closer organizational connections will certainly increase the 
complexity of governance.) All this has shown that the governing 
body must reflect not only the various interests, but an ever wider 
geographic range with more public and private institutions involved. 
Predictions are that the country will ultimately end up with 
three RTOs (east of the Rockies, west of the Rockies, and Texas). 
Indeed, it seems likely that the whole North American continent, 
already somewhat interconnected, will eventually become 
structurally united under one entity. (If this fails to happen, it will 
12. RTOs seem to be moving in the direction of not-for-profit, and such 
firms behave differently from for-profit firms. See Anup Malani et al., Theories 
of Firm Behavior in the Nonprofit Sector: A Synthesis and Empirical 
Evaluation, in THE GoVERNANCE OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 181 
(Edward L. Glaeser ed., 2003) ("[A)large body of theoretical and empirical work 
has emerged to describe and document how NFP firms behave, focusing in 
particular on how they behave differently than for-profit (FP) firms."). Given 
the differences, specific research into the behavior of ISOs/RTOs would be 
useful. 
13. Experiments with for-profit entities, often called "transco," have failed, 
usually because they have not been able to demonstrate the requisite 
independence. 
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be engineering constraints that prevent it.) At present, however, 
there are significantly more than three RTOs. Six ISOs have 
attained RTO status. 14 Since a variety of RTOs are vying for place, 
there are various governance models. While similar multifaceted 
and multilevel governance structures are essentially replicated 
throughout the existing RTOs, there are significant differences.15 
PJM Interconnection, covering the northeastern United States 
("PJM"), and California Independent System Operator ("CAISO") 
are two informative examples. 
1. PJM: Governance Using a Corporate Model 
PJM is the oldest RTO. It began before restructuring with the 
combination of utilities in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland 
(hence the acronym). Today, it seems positioned to manage the 
entire East Coast grid. PJM is well established, with enough 
success and longevity to give it some stature among RTO 
organizations. PJM is steadily increasing its operating area and at 
present coordinates the movements of electricity through all or part 
of Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New 
Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and 
Washington, D.C. PJM has resolved key issues of independence, 
governance, and multi-state operation, and, therefore, serves as a 
useful RTO governance model. 
In the PJM governance system, the central authority is the 
Board of Managers ("Board").16 The Board is charged with operating 
a fair energy market. No person who has a personal affiliation, 
ongoing professional relationship, or financial stake in any PJM 
market participant may serve on the Board.17 A Members 
Committee provides advice to the Board and has representatives 
from the key interests: generators, transmission owners, 
distributors, other suppliers, and consumers.18 A Nominating 
Committee made up of stakeholders and Board members fills 
14. The current lineup is ISO New England, the New York ISO, the PJM 
Interconnection, the Midwest ISO, and the California ISO. Added to these is 
ERCOT ISO in Texas, which is not within FERC's jurisdiction. 
15. F.E.R.C., RTO-ISO HANDBOOK 2-16 (2004). 
16. PJM Interconnection, Independence, at http://www.pjm.com/about/ 
independence.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2005). 
17. PJM INTERCONNECTION, OPERATING AGREEMENT OF PJM 
INTERCONNECTION, L.L.C. § 7.2, at 30 (2003) [hereinafter PJM OA]. The 
agreement was approved by FERC through 2004. PJM also serves as a good 
example because its documents are so readily available, suggesting that 
transparency may actually be good business given PJM's success. 
18. Id. § 8.1.1, at 34. The Meml:>ers Committee includes all members of 
PJM (approximately 330) and is too large to act as an effective governing body. 
PJM Interconnection, PJM I MAAC Members Committee, at 
http://www. pjm.com/committees/membersldownloads/mc. pdf (last modified Mar. 
23, 2005). 
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vacancies on the Board. 19 The Market Monitoring Unit ("Unit") 
guards against the exercise of market power by any market 
participant.20 The Unit analyzes market data and takes action to 
make structural or rule changes to ensure the integrity of the 
market.21 Various specialized committees, such as the Reliability 
Committee or the Finance Committee (collectively, the "Subject 
Matter Committees"), work to refine and improve rules, policies, and 
processes.22 Input also comes from User Groups, such as nuclear 
owners groups or environmental groups, and working groups (for 
example, the Black Start Service Working Group and the Retail 
Access Working Group).23 PJM also pledges to "work closely with 
state regulatory commissions to identify and respond to local 
matters. "24 These state and local energy authorities are given 
liaison or ex officio status on the Subject Matter Committees.25 
2. CAISO: Governance Using a Government Model 
Charles G. Stalon, a former FERC commissioner, contrasts the 
"relatively strong'' PJM, as well as other northeastern RTOs, with 
CAIS0.26 The California governance structure has some of the same 
19. PJM Interconnection L.L.C., 102 F.E.R.C. 'II 61,188 (2003) (order 
accepting tariff sheets) (stating that PJM proposes to approve election to the 
Board by a simple majority). The Nominating Committee consists of seven 
voting members: one from each of the five sectors of the Members Committee 
(generation, transmission, distribution, other suppliers, and end users) and two 
members of the Board of Managers. PJM OA, supra note 17, § 7.1, at 29. 
20. PJM Interconnection, Market Monitoring, at http://www.pjm.com/ 
markets/market-monitor/market-monitor.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2005). 
21. Id. 
22. PJM Interconnection, PJM Committees, at http://www.pjm.com/ 
committees/pjm.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2005). 
23. PJM Interconnection, Working Groups I User Groups, at 
http://www.pjm.com/committees/work-group.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2005). 
24. PJM Interconnection, Independence, at http://www.pjm.com/about/ 
independence.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2005). 
25. PJM OA, supra note 17, § 8.2.2, at 35. 
26. Charles G. Stalon, What Went Wrong in California, at 
http://www.icc.state.il.us/ec/docs/010214calstalon.pdf ((Feb. 8, 2001)). Stalon 
writes: 
[The Northeastern ISOs] have much more information at their 
disposal than does the California ISO and PX [POOLCO]. 
In California both the ISO and PX had large "stakeholder" boards. 
In contrast [to California], the three Northeastern SOS have relative 
small "independent" boards. This has permitted the FERC to place 
important responsibilities on the Northeastern ISOs and for those 
ISOs to respond and make relatively quick reforms to make their 
system work better. 
These boards are preserving the credibility of the markets in their 
territories despite the fact that the legislatures in the Northeast 
states have made some of the same compromises that were made in 
California, especially ones that created inelastic demand curves. 
Id. at 5. 
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general components as the PJM.27 Whereas the PJM structure 
evolved from the corporate model, however, CAISO reflects a 
governmental model. In 1997, CAISO started with a twenty-seven-
member board, representing various interests in the electricity 
industry, from industry members to consumers. CAISO proved to be 
a triumph of participation over operational effectiveness. While 
CAISO had the political benefit of seating all the interests at the 
table, it proved incapable of governing itself.28 
In 2001, the California legislature passed legislation disbanding 
the CAISO board and creating the current five-member board 
appointed by the governor.29 FERC rejected this design.30 Although 
it applauded the improvement over the prior board, FERC decided 
that a governor-appointed board was insufficiently independent. 
Since California was a market participant, it was a significant 
stakeholder.31 FERC insisted on an independent, non-stakeholder 
board. The D.C. Circuit, however, vacated FERC's order "[b]ecause 
FERC has no authority to replace the selection method or 
membership of the governing board of an ISO, let alone to compel a 
corporation created by state law to employ a governing board chose 
in violation of that law ... .',a2 
Issues of authority aside, FERC's stakeholder objection seems 
myopic. Of more concern must be the Board's political nature. The 
CAISO board raises many of the same problems identified with 
other, often five-member, state regulatory agencies. In fact, the 
CAISO board is more problematic, because, unlike the regulatory 
authorities, the CAISO board has direct management 
responsibilities. Again, the successful system must incorporate 
principles of collaborative governance, where government and 
private authorities work together as problem solvers. As 
government institutes become more dominant, decision making 
27. CAL. INDEPENDENT SYS. OPERATOR CORP., AMENDED & RESTATED BYLAWS 
OF CALIFORNIA INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATOR CORP., at http://www.caiso.com/ 
docs/2000/06/01/2000060110361815044.pdf (Apr. 2001). 
28. San Diego Gas & Electric Co., 93 F.E.R.C. 'II 61,121, (2000) (stating that 
the Board was having "such difficulty reaching decisions on the complex and 
divisive issues confronting it that it has become ineffective" and it was coming 
under "undue pressure from various sources."); see also Stalon, supra note 26 
("In California both the ISO and the PX had large 'stakeholder' boards."). 
29. A.B. 5, 2001 Leg., 1st Exec. Sess. (Ca. 2001); see also CAL. AsSEMBLY 
COMM. ON ENERGY COSTS AND AVAILABILITY, REPORT ON ELECTRICAL 
RESTRUCTURING (200 1), available at http://www .leginfo.ca.gov/pub/ 
0102/bill/asm/ab_00010050/abxl_5_cfa_20010111_171856_asm_comm.html; 
CAL. AsSEMBLY SENATE ENERGY, UTILITIES AND COMMUNICATIONS COMM., BILL 
ANALYSIS (2001), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/ 
01-02/bill/asm/ab_0001-0050/abx_5_cfa_20010117_114651_sen_comm.html. 
30. Mirant Delta, L.L.C., 100 F.E.R.C. 'II 61,059, at 61,227 (2002). 
31. Id. at 61,222 ("[The Department of Water Resources) is now the largest 
purchaser of energy in the California wholesale market."). 
32. Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. F.E.R.C., 372 F.3d 395, 398 (D.C. Cir. 
2004). 
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becomes political rather than technical and economic. While a 
stakeholder board raises the specter of discrimination against one or 
more interest groups, a political board presents the danger of 
exogenous motivations. 
Members of a board chosen by an elected official are also more 
likely to be selected for their political competence than for their 
knowledge of the electricity industry.33 Competent management of 
the system is crucial. Chaos in California revealed the potential 
damage from sophisticated gaming of the system and from 
governance characteristics that make a system incapable of dealing 
with such conduct. 34 In short, governance cannot rely on members to 
deal honestly with their RTOs. The inability of CAISO to respond to 
events, including obvious dishonesty, provides a lesson for RTO 
design. The California crisis also demonstrates that collaborative 
governance must be capable of dealing with the worst motives of any 
market participant.35 This experience emphasizes the danger of 
putting broad participation, even if politically beneficial, ahead of 
viable decision making. In other words, a governing organization 
must not only be able to manage a complex electricity system, it 
must also be able to make decisions in the face of highly 
sophisticated efforts to manipulate any system. 
In sum, positive government is necessary in the electricity 
industry. Yet, the classic corporate governance form of the 
integrated era must be replaced by more broadly accessible, 
accountable, and transparent decision-making structures. 
Breakdowns in some attempts to develop governance organizations 
provide experiential information that will spur the evolution of 
optimum RTO governance. Of more value is the governance process 
used by the most successful RTO. This organization has modified 
the corporate model in a way that is sensitive to these broader goals 
and should form the foundation for a universal governance model. 
Nonetheless, examination of the impediments to full 
accomplishment of the collaborative government principles suggests 
some improvements on that model. 
33. Mirant Delta, L.L.C., 100 F.E.R.C. 'II. 61,059, at 61,229 ("As the Audit 
Report details, the current Board members, for the most part, 'have no prior 
utility experience.'"). 
34. See, e.g., Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Can Energy Markets Be Trusted? 
The Effect of the Rise and Fall of Enron on Energy Markets, 4 Hous. Bus. & TAX 
L.J. 1 (2004); see also Timothy P. Duane, Regulation's Rationale: Learning from 
the California Energy Crisis, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 471 (2002). 
35. See generally CAL. ISO BD. OF GoVERNORS, REPORT BY THE CALIFORNIA 
ISO BOARD OF GoVERNORS REGARDING MATTERS RAISED BY THE SENATE SELECT 
COMM. TO INVESTIGATE PRICE MANIPULATION OF THE WHOLESALE ENERGY MKT., at 
http://www .caiso.com/docs/2004/06/04/2004060408060514905. pdf (June 2004). 
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Ill. IMPEDIMENTS TO COOPERATIVE DECISION MAKING 
Being "in the room," does not mean having influence in the 
electricity industry. Electricity is a unique commodity in terms of 
both engineering and economics. Affecting decision making requires 
considerable sophistication in engineering, "the business," and a 
specialty brand of law. In addition, the industry has been operating 
for more than one hundred years and, over that time, interest 
groupings have been established that will not soon be dissipated. In 
short, cooperative decision making, as opposed to mere pro forma 
broad participation, must adjust for unequal expertise and an 
entrenched industry culture. 
A Importance of Expertise to Influence 
Electricity is not like other products. For one thing, its "units" 
are not just fungible but identical. While electricity is described in 
units (for example, it is sold in kilowatt hours), one unit is 
indistinguishable from another. Where one unit of electricity ends, 
another begins without interruption. Indeed, electricity is a 
continuous flow. One who buys a kilowatt hour does not know the 
source of that particular kilowatt hour. One who produces a 
kilowatt hour does not know who actually consumes that kilowatt 
hour. In short, the industry cannot be envisioned in terms of the 
normal operation of a market, with buyers purchasing a particular 
unit through a negotiation with a particular seller. Simply for a 
consumer to reach a contract with a generator to supply electricity is 
impossible. Thus, after the elimination of the integrated system 
(wherein consumers bought a bundled end product from an 
integrated supplier), the "contract path" (through which the 
generated electricity passed from the generator through the 
transmission lines and distribution system to an end user) became a 
fiction that allowed market participants to visualize an electricity 
market in traditional terms. But this vision is not real in either 
engineering or market terms. 
Adding to potential misunderstanding by the uninitiated is the 
engineering reality of "transporting'' electricity. Electricity cannot 
be directed. A unit of electricity cannot be loaded on a truck and 
shipped to a designated destination, nor can its transportation be 
accurately visualized in those terms. Electricity cannot even be 
directed by valves and pumps, as can water and gas; it must be 
teased along through engineering that even those in the industry do 
not fully grasp. In short, outsiders are at sea and easily deceived, 
especially by language that tends to convey a sense of control that is 
not reality. 
Both engineering and market features create an inherent 
advantage for those who understand the engineering and 
commercial realities of the industry. Conversely, the same 
engineering and commercial complexities create impressive 
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impediments and overwhelming disadvantages for outsiders. For 
example, an outsider might think that building new facilities will 
necessarily upgrade the system. However, insiders know that it is 
possible that building a new generator or even transmission line 
might result in a decrease in available electricity. Even if the new 
facility succeeds in injecting additional electricity into the system, 
more expensive new electricity might displace cheaper established 
electricity. The complexity of generating and transmitting 
electricity makes broad participation, accountability, and 
understandable transparency equally complex goals. 
Issues relevant directly to generation and transmission are 
further clouded by the variety of "ancillary" services associated with 
getting the electricity to its markets. Control of ancillary services 
can bias an electricity system. One not familiar with the actual 
operating components of the electricity industry will not understand 
the implications of decisions and policies relating to this 
conglomeration of often very technical services. The ancillary 
services themselves in the restructured industry create a whole body 
of new and challenging scientific and economic questions. The 
uninitiated, however, may see them as, well, ancillary and--even if 
they understand their importance-will have difficulty 
understanding the policy choices these services present. 
In sum, the absence of not just expertise but real understanding 
of the realities of generating, transmitting, and distributing 
electricity makes participation by outsiders somewhat pro forma. 
Even without conscious efforts to deceive, the values built into the 
system by insiders might be questioned by representatives of less 
knowledgeable interest groups, if such groups were as 
knowledgeable as the insiders. Unfortunately, knowledgeable 
outsiders are a rarity. The inequality of engineering and 
commercial expertise between insiders and outsiders cannot be 
compensated for by "book learning." Actual operating experience is 
crucial, yet this experience is available only to those within the 
industry. Overcoming the expertise deficit is a special challenge for 
cooperative decision making in the electricity industry. 
B. Restructuring the Cultural Hierarchy 
Culture is resilient, and significantly displacing established 
cultures is a long and uncertain process. The segments of the 
electricity industry were united in a vertically integrated culture as 
well as corporate form. This culture and its concomitant hierarchies 
will be the last remnants of the old regime to disappear in the 
restructured electricity industry. This embedded stratification 
continues to dictate the relationship among industry participants in 
the new regime. In addition, this culture skews the participation by 
players in the system, both public and private, who for generations 
orbited these dominant bodies. These interests are struggling to 
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find places within the new restructured regime. The new culture, 
perhaps more than the old, vertically integrated structure, remains 
a major impediment to true cooperative decision making. 
1. The Integrated Industry Culture 
The central authority of the integrated utility derived from 
control of the "big wires" (the cross-country, ''wholesale" 
transmission assets). When integrated utilities were forced to 
"unbundle," they tended to retain ownership (and thereby control) of 
transmission and to divest generation and (where, possible) 
distribution functions. As ISOs evolved into RTOs, they aimed to 
separate control from ownership of transmission because control of 
the big wires meant control of the system. Still, even with nominal 
control of the lines by the ISO or RTO, transmission owners retained 
their dominant position, much like the old aristocracies in 
nineteenth-century democracies. The continued dominance of the 
transmission owners persists, and they have substantial say, no 
matter the form of participation, in the new system. The cultural 
stratification of the industry has continued into the restructuring 
era. 
Two key segments that were once part of the integrated firm, 
generation and distribution, retain adjunct status and thereby 
maintain insider status, which results in coordinate relationships. 
Restructuring has focused on the problem of "affiliates." Affiliate 
firms are firms that are separate in corporate form but have 
common owners; affiliates sometimes continue their old 
relationships, to the detriment of the market. Despite efforts to 
limit the flow of information among affiliates, many fmd that 
inappropriate communication still exists and negatively affects the 
performance of the industry. A level playing field would go a long 
way in creating real separation and independence among the 
segments of the former regime, but insiders have had difficulty 
breaking free of the old power relationships. 
True cooperative decision making requires real influence for 
groups that were industry outsiders under the old vertically 
integrated regime. Small firms and public power organizations are 
chief among these. After Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States,36 
public power and cooperatives provided the only real competition, 
indeed countervailing force, in the industry. Since restructuring, 
public power and cooperatives retain their pariah status within the 
36. 410 U.S. 366 (1973). This case is seminal because it recognized the 
possibility of competition in the electricity industry and began the restructuring 
movement. Significant even today is the example of abusive behavior by the 
large, integrated utility. The utility attempted to drive out competition from 
small municipal utilities which were able to sell electricity at prices well below 
those of the dominant utility. Such conduct continues to be a potential danger. 
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electricity establishment.37 On the other hand, they still provide the 
best opportunity for retail competition in many markets. Bringing 
such entities into the structure, and perhaps facilitating their 
growth, should be a goal of the RTOs. Listening to the needs of 
public power and cooperative organizations will enable them to 
continue to serve as the best hope for mitigating market dominance 
and indeed challenging the practices of the central governing entity. 
RTO governance must promote such a role. 
2. Customers and Industry Culture 
Restructuring actually intensified the divide on the other side of 
the market: the consumer side. For convenience, consumers may be 
segregated into three groups: large business, small business, and 
residential.38 In the integrated culture, large businesses dealt on a 
somewhat equal business footing with their soul mates, the large 
integrated utilities. The contestability of their relationship was 
somewhat "off-stage." Even large consumers in a regulated 
environment took what the system gave them. However, large 
consumers could be players in the political environment of perhaps 
equal stature to that of the utilities. Large consumers have enough 
economic power to create alternatives, even when their local utility 
has some degree of market power. Restructuring has opened a 
contest in the marketplace as well as the political arena. Indeed, in 
this new regime, the large business customers might obtain some 
economic advantage since alternatives to the local utility have 
evolved to compete for their business. Moreover, as the power of the 
utilities is diminished by unbundling, the utilities tend to need 
alliances with their large customers to dominate the political 
· environment. New alliances in the political arena create a danger of 
utilities and their large and politically powerful consumers 
exercising unified power in RTO governance. 
Neither small business nor residential consumers gain 
bargaining power through restructuring, and both continue to be 
price and service takers. In the former regime, they were protected 
by regulation. Now small consumers depend on a real, functioning 
market and are the most likely victims of market failures. While big 
consumers have the power to assure against such failures, small 
business and residential consumers must depend on the protection 
afforded by collaborative action with the RT0.39 Their stake in RTO 
37. See Order 2000, supra note 1, § H.1, at 930-31. 
38. One convenient divide, for example, defines large commercial and 
industrial customers as those that use more than one hundred to two hundred 
kilowatt hours. ABA SECTION OF PuBLIC UTILITY, COMMUNICATIONS, AND 
TRANSPORTATION LAW, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 189 (2004). 
39. See generally John E. Kwoka, Jr., Governance Alternatives and Pricing 
in the U.S. Electric Power Industry, 18 J. L. EcoN. & ORG. 278 (2002). This 
study finds that public ownership and the commensurate public influence had 
very different effects among consumer groups, with residential customers 
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governance is highest. Yet, small consumers may find big business 
and utility owners dominating RTO governance. Small businesses 
and, even more, residential consumers are both individually 
powerless. Residential consumers find it particularly difficult to 
organize for their own protection. Fair RTO governance must 
assure a voice for these small consumers that is not surreptitiously 
dominated by the more powerful interests. It must assure that the 
small consumers are not submerged within a universal "consumer" 
interest as defined by large industrial and commercial consumers. 
The tendency to measure success of restructuring in aggregates 
and averages hides the real impact on small business and 
residential consumers. AI; the industry opens to farther ranging 
market opportunities, there will be losers. For example, Virginia 
historically has had relatively low rates. It is now joining PJM and, 
as a result, Virginia utilities will have access to the northeastern 
markets, in which rates are high. Virginia's utilities lobbied hard 
for this opportunity to sell in markets that offer higher profits 
despite opposition from state regulators.40 Victory for the utilities 
means they can expect to move electricity into these new, more 
lucrative markets. In aggregate, east coast rates might decrease, 
but prices are equally likely to increase for Virginia's small business 
and residential consumers, who are not able to bargain for long-term 
contracts. RTO management will not intervene to equalize 
bargaining power among consumer groups. The disincentive for 
RTO management to protect these small consumers increases the 
vulnerability of these politically weak consumer groups. Adequate 
opportunities to participate in governance decisions, as well as 
transparency and accountability in RTO decisions, may lead to 
choices that will mitigate this impact as the mechanics of true 
cooperative decision making are developed. 
The influence of residential consumers is further weakened by 
the realities of the electricity market. For retail consumers, 
restructuring is the triumph of theory over practice. Retail 
consumers are not likely to assume what economists call the "search 
costs" to make a viable competitive residential market. Thus, if 
residential consumers are to get a fair deal (let alone an advantage) 
from restructuring, it will be through the vigilance of the RTO 
governing entity and government energy authorities. Hence, these 
consumers in particular need adequate representation in the RTO 
governing entity. 
benefiting most, commercial customers less, and industrial customers not at all. 
Id. at 291-92. If similar behavior can be expected from RTOs which are made 
truly responsive to the public, then that real representation can be expected to 
have tangible benefits for residential consumers. 
40. See generally VIRGINIA STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION, REVIEW OF 
FERC's PROPOSED STANDARD MARKET DESIGN AND POTENTIAL RISK TO ELECTRIC 
SERVICE IN VIRGINIA (Jan. 3, 2003), available at http://www.scc.virginia.gov/ 
caseinfo/reportsllttf_addendum_02.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2004). 
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3. The Underrepresented 
There is another group of consumers for which the danger is not 
underrepresentation, but no representation. These are the 
consumers who were protected under the old regime by the 
"universal service" principle.41 In 2005, even the lowest economic 
level of the community requires electricity. The old regulatory 
regime could assure service by fiat, but guaranteed service is 
inimical to a market approach. Restructuring means that protection 
of service must be dealt with outside the electricity market 
mechanisms. Rather than being imposed by regulatory authorities, 
universal electricity service must be part of the social benefits 
package. Nonetheless, choices will be made that affect those unable 
to pay market prices, and those interests must be effectively 
represented in RTO governance. Cooperative decision making in 
this regard may mean surrogate representatives, either public or 
private, for interests that have no ability to represent themselves. 
4. Captive Researcher Usue 
All of the above interests are visible, though some are not 
adequately represented in electricity governance. The stealth 
players in the old menage who may be perhaps even more dominant 
in the new regime are the captured research organizations and 
scholars. Utility wealth allows it to finance research and 
scholarship in policy advocacy as well as in technical innovation. 
(Indeed, a motivation for restructuring was the assertion that the 
old monopolies lacked incentives to advance technology and 
conversely were unduly motivated to engage in policy advocacy.) 
The alliances of these information generators were disclosed to me 
when I suggested to several associations representing the various 
electricity interests that an objective, impartial research 
undertaking to provide objective, independent study and 
information was needed. The lack of interest surprised me until one 
association official told me they did not want such impartiality. An 
expose of the Harvard group further supports skepticism as to the 
relationship between key scholars and the industry.42 Transparency 
and a special type of accountability are essential to the effective and 
fair policymaking future of the industry. Yet the foundational 
information on which policy is based continues to be provided by 
scholars and research organizations of questionable alliances and 
motivations. Unless this group of captive researchers can be 
41. Jim Rossi, The Common Law "Duty to Serve" and Protection of 
Consumers in an Age of Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 51 
VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1288-99 (1998); Jim Rossi, Universal Service in Competitive 
Retail Electric Power Markets: Whither the Duty to Serve?, 21 ENERGY L.J. 27, 
38-47 (2000). 
42. Harvard Watch, Trading Truth: A Report on Harvard's Enron 
Entanglements, at http://www.harvardwatch.org (Jan. 31, 2002). 
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counterbalanced, interest groups without such support will 
participate at a great disadvantage. The RTOs should fill the gap. 
To avoid similar capture, their study arms should operate under 
conditions of extreme transparency and should define their "clients" 
as the entire universe of market participants, related interests, and 
information users. 
Culture is, of course, the most persistent of human institutions. 
Changing the structure of the electricity industry no more changes 
its culture than it does in other human endeavors. Governance 
design, therefore, must confront the remnants of the old integrated 
culture and not assume that institutional change is unaffected by 
that culture. But cultures do change and, over time, participation, 
accountability, and transparency become vehicles for changing the 
culture of the electricity industry. However, restructuring now 
ignores the depth of these integrated company instincts at the 
expense of its ultimate performance. 
IV. CUSTOM DESIGN FOR COOPERATIVE RTO DECISION MAKING 
As we know, electricity is not an industry in which deregulation 
can be a simple matter of setting the industry free. Deregulation 
required a sophisticated new industry design, "restructuring." As 
the market devices must be special, so too must the industry's 
decision-making mechanisms be specially designed with careful 
attention to the nature of the industry and the organizational 
culture. In addition, the RTOs must be public-regarding. While they 
should not replicate the general political process, they cannot regard 
themselves as merely private businesses.43 Diversity of interests 
requires cooperative decision making, and cooperative decision 
making is impeded by inequalities in resources and position. At 
present, these difficulties are glossed over by superficial 
opportunities for broad participation. But, as we have seen, the 
focus must be on thoughtful deliberation and sound and impartial 
decision making. 44 The process goal must be to design a 
collaborative problem-solving organization that allows a real public 
dialogue in the face of unique impediments to that dialogue. 
A. A Proposal for the Next Step in Governance 
Proposed here is a design in which an impartial board decides 
and each interest group has its own independent representative to 
the impartial board. Charles Stalon has observed that a small, 
impartial core governing body works better than large, seemingly 
inclusive bodies.45 The optimal central board provides a mechanism 
43. See Kwoka, supra note 39, at 280 ("[A] privately owned utility is 
ultimately responsible to its shareholders and therefore should pursue profit 
maximization rather than managerial benefit or consumer group preference."). 
44. See Rossi, Participation Run Amok, supra note 8. 
45. See Stalon, supra note 26. 
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for competitive policy development rather than inclusion. A 
dialectic within this governance structure assures real consideration 
of all the diverse interests. Such a dialectic should result in the 
movement of deliberation toward a consensus even in an 
organization with clearly distinct interests among its members. In 
an industry with as many competing interest groups as electricity, 
the airing of all views and the competition between those views will 
work so long as the deliberation works toward the common optimum 
performance goal. (As opposed to, say, making profit for certain 
industry segments or promoting environmental extremism.) The 
common goal of a sound and acceptable electricity system in the end 
should compel shared objectives. 
The vision then is a core impartial deliberative body with 
interests organized to represent themselves and with the 
organizational structure designed to assure all these interests have 
real influence. That is, instead of various interests submerged 
within the deliberative body, each interest is organized, recognized, 
and represented as a discrete force. To accomplish this, the RTOs 
should constitute "Representative Committees," whose members 
would come entirely from members of an interest. These 
committees would have staffs that provide them with information 
and help them with the presentation of their interest. 
Superficially, the RTO model seems to have adopted this 
approach. That is, there is a strong movement towards an impartial 
managing board with various committees promoting policies in their 
specialized areas. Suggested here, however, is that this approach, 
while close, fails to foster effective, equal, and transparent 
participation by each of the basic interests. Both expertise and 
cultural tendencies allow the old regime to continue to control RTO 
governance within these committees and on the central governing 
board. 
B. Building on PJM's Model 
PJM, because of its longstanding success, serves as a good 
example of a basic RTO governance organization.46 The 
foundational model, as described above,47 is a general corporate 
approach, but with an effort to bring into governance the various 
divergent interests. 
Each interest has input into the ultimate authority. Additional 
interest representation is provided by the hierarchy of Subject 
Matter Committees that advise the board.48 These committees 
46. PJM OA, supra note 17, at 29-40. The agreement was approved by 
FERC through 2004. PJM also serves as a good example because its documents 
are so readily available, suggesting that transparency may actually be good 
business given PJM's success. 
4 7. See supra notes 16-25 and accompanying text. 
48. PJM INTERCONNECTION, PJM MEMBERS HANDBOOK 6 (2003), available at 
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provide concentrated and expert recommendations on specialized 
issues. The Members Committee and each of the Subject Matter 
Committees include representatives of five sectors: generation 
owners, other suppliers, transmission owners, electric distributors, 
and end-use customers. This sector representation allows 
participation by divergent members within these committees. The 
PJM governance materials state: 
The committees and user groups provide a forum through 
which stakeholders share their positions and resolve 
difficult issues. Market committees are an essential 
component of PJM's governance structure for 
administering an open-access, transparent grid and 
markets. 
This collaborative approach-a hallmark of the way PJM 
conducts business-enhances our ability to manage the 
grid, maintain reliability and assure robust markets.49 
This system is inclusive as far as it goes, but cooperative 
decision making requires more than just adjunct "forums." 
In order to assure real voice, as opposed to mere form, I would 
add to the existing committee structure "Representative 
Committees." Representative Committees would differ from the 
Subject Matter Committees currently incorporated in the general 
RTO!ISO model.50 The Subject Matter Committees, like the Board of 
Managers, mask the relationship between the various interests and 
prevent some interests from having their own influence. Each 
member is represented on these committees, but this merely 
replicates the same alliances and cultural positions that existed in 
the integrated industry.51 Thus, the committees can be dominated 
http://www.pjm.com/committeeslhandbook.pdf [hereinafter PJM MEMBERS 
HANDBOOK]. The handbook notes: 
PJM's Committee structure includes three Senior Standing 
Committees (Members, Electricity Markets and Reliability 
Committees), three additional Standing Committees (Market 
Implementation, Operating and Planning Committees), 
subcommittees or working groups created by these six committees, 
and user groups established in accordance with PJM's Operating 
Agreement. 
Reports and proposals will flow from the subcommittees and 
working groups to their "parent" Standing Committee and from there 
to the "parent" Senior Committee. User groups' report and proposal 
procedures are defined in PJM's Operating Agreement. 
I d.; see also id. at 7 (outlining a graphic diagram of PJM committee structure). 
49. PJM Interconnection, Committees and Groups, at http://www.pjm.com/ 
committees/committees.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2005). 
50. An example is PJM. Its committees are described in PJM MEMBERS 
HANDBOOK, supra note 48. 
51. See PJM Interconnection, Committees and Groups, at 
http://www.pjm.com/committees/committees.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2005) 
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by the same interests that dominate the core decision-making 
authority. Representative Committees would give each sector a 
distinct voice. 
Moreover, Subject Matter Committee representation does not 
necessarily give a voice to the diverse interests within a sector. Of 
particular concern is the end-use consumer sector. Big business 
interests will likely represent consumers on these Subject Matter 
Committees, and their interests may differ significantly from those 
of residential consumers. A Representative Committee would 
encompass all consumer groups. Its positions would reflect an 
aggregate. Indeed, their positions could reflect disagreement among 
consumers. Regardless, the Representative Committee would allow 
transparent airing of several consumer positions and would add 
weight to a consumer position in both the Subject Matter 
Committees and the central management board. 
Members of a Representative Committee would all come from a 
specific interest. In this way, the Representative Committee would 
publicly espouse those interests. The key to success will be the open 
expression of each interest's position on matters of particular 
importance to it. This open contestability for RTO policymaking will 
promote a real dialogue on issues. The disparity in resources and 
expertise of the various interest groups, however, means that each 
Representative Committee must be specially constituted to assure 
that it can actually represent the interest. A residential consumer 
committee, for example, would be useless unless its members had 
analytical resources as well as time and commitment. The 
experience with Negotiated Rulemaking tells us that a public 
interest representative cannot match industry in assuring that they 
"have a voice."52 The lesson that Negotiated Rulemaking teaches us 
is that participatory opportunities must be carefully tailored to the 
interests less able to represent themselves. Because resource 
inequality is a major impediment to giving voice to these interests, 
the Representative Committees should be funded by the RTOs in 
the same way as the Subject Matter Committees. Since some of 
these interests necessarily lack expertise, the RTO should assure 
that some, at least, of these Representative Committees have expert 
advice available through either permanent staff or consultants. 
C. Implementation Concerns 
Perhaps public advocacy will not be enough. More weight could 
be added by giving the Representative Committees' views special 
weight. This process would require that, for specified types of 
decisions, Representative Committees of specially impacted 
("Members can designate a representative for any committee using an online 
form."). 
52. See CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.36 
(2d ed. 1997). 
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interests would be consulted, and their views would have special 
weight in the adoption of a measure. No interest, even nominally 
"public interests," on the other hand, should have essentially a veto 
over any matter, even those of special concern to the interest. 
Giving Representative Committees weight without shifting the 
balance so that they have undue influence would be the key. One 
approach would be that changes suggested by that Representative 
Committee may only be rejected by a supermajority of the board. 
Under other previously identified conditions, Representative 
Committee views would require special justification and support for 
a measure. 
Now I have created the platform for a multitude of committees. 
The Subject Matter Committees are themselves numerous as well as 
useful. Representative Committees, however, may not be similarly 
numerous. Not all interests need a Representative Committee. 
Large transmission owners and large industrial consumers can 
safely be discriminated against in this regard. They are likely to 
have sufficient influence absent participation in the Representative 
Committees. 
Moreover, there can be a distinction between a direct interest 
that requires a RTO-supported Representative Committee and other 
more indirect interests, such as general business, broad 
environmental advocacy, or local governments. Some 
Representative Committees might be identified as advocacy-only 
committees. The RTO should assure access to the Representative 
Committee structure for other interests, which are left to choose 
how they will organize themselves. As to these less-structured 
interests, the RTO, while not sponsoring the interest, should 
concern itself if these interests are not represented in some form. 
For example, the RTO should assure the participation of social 
welfare advocates concerned with universal service issues, even 
though these problems in the market environment will generally be 
dealt with elsewhere. 
The emerging governance regime has potential in that the RTO 
Subject Matter Committee approach assures the participation of 
diverse interests, as in the case of the PJM. However, the danger is 
that because of disparities in expertise and stature, mere 
representation on each Subject Matter Committee will not assure 
real participation and accountability. Representative Committees 
provide a single voice for each crucial interest, and supplying the 
Representative Committees with advice and expertise will allow 
these otherwise underrepresented interests to have actual influence 
in the governance process. 
V. RESTRUCTURING STATE AND LOCAL ENERGY AUTHORITIES 
As direct governance shifts to regional (multistate) authorities 
and remaining regulation by necessity becomes national and is 
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dominated by FERC, state and local energy authorities are slowly 
being pushed off the stage.53 These authorities have fought this 
movement politically, but practically they seem increasingly 
irrelevant. They cling to their status under the Federal Power Act,54 
but their loss of real power is inevitable. Yet this new regime 
creates new opportunities if the state and local energy authorities 
have the vision to seize them. These institutions could play vibrant 
and perhaps crucial roles in the restructured industry. 
A. A Mere Change in Character 
The current regime has been evolving a role for state and local 
energy authorities. RTO entities are developing ways to bring these 
authorities within their compass.55 While this movement may be 
attractive to the authorities as they contemplate the loss of real 
regulatory authority, it may trap them in a superficial role. Rather 
than gratefully letting FERC and the RTOs impose this inferior role, 
they should redefine their own role in the new regime. This role 
should clearly separate these governmental authorities from the 
private business operations. The state regulators should avoid 
becoming hollow relics of the regulatory age and transform 
themselves into public representatives, investigative/disclosure 
vehicles, ultimate monitors/whistleblowers, and the instruments for 
resolving individual disputes between their citizens and the 
electricity industry. 56 
53. In a way, this may be an overstatement. While there is a strong 
movement among electricity entities toward creating or joining regional 
transmission organizations, many states are not actively restructuring. Status 
of State Electric Industry Restructuring Activity as of February 2003, at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity (Feb. 2003). Even though the Supreme 
Court accepted the notion that FERC could assert jurisdiction over regional 
electricity organizations in New York u. F.E.R.C., 535 U.S. 1, 23-24 (2002), the 
ultimate function of state regulatory authorities in the emerging system has yet 
to be decided. As always, that will be a political question. 
54. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-93, 796-818, 820-23, 823a-25r (2000). 
55. For example, governmental authorities may have ex officio status on 
any Subject Matter Committee and/or be represented through a "Liaison 
Committee." See PJM OA, supra note 17, § 8.2.2, at 35; see also PJM 
Interconnection, PJM Committees, at http://www. pjm.com/committees/ 
pjm.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2005). ("The State Commission Liaison 
Committee, consisting of all the PJM state utility commissioners, meets 
annually with the PJM Board of Managers to discuss matters of mutual 
interest."). 
56. In a sense, state agencies may have come full circle. The Massachusetts 
Board of Railroad Commissioners under Charles Francis Adams, the first 
important regulatory-like authority, was committed to these types of roles: 
[Adams' and his fellow railroad commissioners'] theme, in a word, was 
voluntarism, promoted by publicity and disclosure, disciplined by the 
unwavering support of the state legislature. When the question at 
hand involved general policy, the commission initiated. When the 
issue had to do with some particular controversy, the commission 
reacted. In all cases, the agency advised rather than coerced. It 
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State and local energy authorities could inject truly 
independent elements into the restructured regime. The state 
Public Utility Commission or Public Service Commission staffs, 
along with many local energy authorities, offer a pool of expert and 
independent workers who could be employed in many public interest 
roles and perform functions that cannot be expected to be 
accomplished otherwise. As discussed above, real participation 
requires expertise. Many of the interests affected by RTO decisions, 
even with access, cannot expect to have influence because they 
cannot hope to marshal equal or even adequate understanding of the 
complex engineering and commercial issues at stake. The state and 
local energy authority staffs already employ the necessary experts. 
In addition to expertise disparities, as discussed above, existing 
industry culture often dictates the role of the players in the 
restructured industry. The state and local energy authorities 
traditionally play the roles of monitor, public representative, and 
ombudsman in individual disputes. Both the industry and the 
citizenry are accustomed to the state regulators playing those roles. 
The established culture does not need to be changed in order for 
them to continue to do so, and they can easily reconfigure 
themselves into these roles. At the same time as they are losing 
some direct control over a part of the industry, they could 
seamlessly upgrade and concentrate on these roles. In the end, the 
state regulators could fill a very special and pervasive role, 
projecting them into every aspect of the industry, including those 
from which they had been excluded under the old regime. 
B. Various Roles State Regulators Could Assume 
The existing expertise and stature of the state and local energy 
authorities is too valuable a resource to be squandered. In order to 
make full use of this resource, state and local governments, as well 
as the agencies themselves, must leave behind the past functions 
associated with direct regulation over retail rates and performance. 
Their new roles could include acting as public representatives, 
information gatherers and disseminators, monitors of general 
industry conduct, and protectors of their citizens in individual 
disputes with industry players. 
1. Public Representative 
The best representative for the public and other especially 
representationally disadvantaged interests could be the state and 
local energy authorities. While FERC regulates, the state and local 
energy authorities might represent. Representing interests in the 
several electricity forums, RTO government, FERC, and legislatures 
served now as broker, now mediator, now ombudsman. 
THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 25 (1984). 
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is a difficult business. Public representation is particularly 
disadvantaged. Issues in the industry are complex and arcane. On 
one hand, fear of damaging the delivery of reliable service often 
inhibits public representatives, including legislators, from 
questioning industry policymaking. On the other hand, simplistic 
answers may, in fact, do more harm than good. More importantly, 
the true impact of choices may not be recognized, and 
representatives of the public and other interests can be easily teased 
along with solutions that might not adequately reflect concern for 
those interests. 
In the old regulatory regime, the role of state and local energy 
authorities was defined within the national regulatory system. 
Their function was always subordinated to the larger whole. The 
new regional configuration could set them free to become 
independent public representatives, unimpeded by system 
constraints. With such freedom, each state and local authority will 
be alert, creating multiple independent and public-sensitive 
oversight opportunities. Cooperation and sharing of resources and 
information with other interests will make them stronger and more 
influential. Indeed, a tacit division of labor might arise that will be 
valuable to these always underfunded entities. On the other hand, 
unity among state regulatory authorities will give them more 
influence with Congress, FERC, and the RTOs. Imagine the impact 
that, say, the unified views of New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio 
energy authorities might have on national and RTO policymakers. 
This role of public advocate and defender of the 
underrepresented will create a positive image for state regulators. 
Such a role may acquire much more stature than the second class, 
often deadweight, role of their former position. Certainly, it will be 
superior to the coconspirator image they often acquired in the 
regulatory days and may be in danger of retaining in the new 
regime. Even though they seem to be losing their former direct 
power, in the end they could become stronger and more important to 
the efficient and fair performance of the electricity industry. 
2. Investigative I Disclosure Vehicles 
Transparency, while it might protect the market, is not enough 
to protect the public. 57 Electricity is so fraught with business and 
engineering complexity that even honest disclosure, as such, is of no 
use to many interests. State and local energy authorities have the 
expertise to understand the information made available by the RTO 
and the incentive to evaluate that information from the public's 
point of view. These authorities can digest and develop information 
for both the general public and interests that cannot do so 
57. See Final Report on Price Manipulation in Western Markets-Fact-
Finding Investigation of Potential Manipulation of Electricity and Natural Gas 
Prices, 99 F.E.R.C. 'll 61,272 (2002). 
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themselves. 
State and local authorities also have the expertise and, 
hopefully, will retain the resources to conduct independent study 
and investigation. As we have seen, the industry has for 
generations controlled the freestanding study organizations and 
high-profile scholars. Public representatives and those of several 
other interests simply lack the resources to replicate that research 
and scholarship. The staffs of state and local regulatory authorities 
can fill the analytical gap to the benefit of the public 
representatives, as well as the furtherance of crafting a new role of 
governmental energy authorities. 
3. Monitors I Whistleblowers 
Implicit in the above, but more confrontational, is direct 
oversight. Hopefully, public-regarding conduct will follow public 
representation and transparency, but such a collaborative ideal 
seems unrealistic given the industry's history.58 It is likely that 
from time-to-time, the public interest will require more than 
honorable aspirations and full disclosure; its representatives will 
have to employ coercive means. 
Publicity can be a powerful tool. State and local energy 
authorities may resort to the coercive effect of publicizing industry 
misconduct. Drawing attention to the real impact of the conduct of 
the RTOs or their members may be an effective, yet non-intrusive, 
device for curbing public-disregarding behavior. Fear of disclosure 
may be a deterrent that will make actual whistleblowing rarely 
necessary. 
Direct action may be found necessary under certain conditions. 59 
It may be that the state and local energy authorities themselves 
should retain some coercive mechanisms, but that will quickly raise 
many of the questions which plagued the old regime. A cleaner 
approach may be to transform them into independent advocates for 
public-regarding policies before FERC, Congress, and state 
legislatures. More directly, they may also be given authority to take 
court action on behalf of the public or groups who lack the resources 
to do so. 
4. Individual Complaints 
In addition to monitoring general policy and conduct, the state 
and local energy authorities could perform an equally valuable 
58. See, e.g., RICHARD RUDOLPH & SCO'IT RIDLEY, POWER STRUGGLE: THE 
HUNDRED-YEAR WAR OVER ELECTRICITY (1986) (outlining the clashes of various 
interests during the industry's last century). 
59. See Jim Rossi, Lowering the Filed Tariff Shield: Judicial Enforcement 
for a Deregulatory Era, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1591, 1626 (2003) ("In a deregulated 
market, enforceable remedies for misconduct are important to deter fraud and 
other types of strategic market manipulation."). 
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function regarding individual relations with the RTO and its 
members. The mediation character of an ombudsman, rather than 
an adversarial approach, seems preferable here. Ombudsmen try 
hard to work with decision makers to correct problems. However, 
this approach requires a good deal of public trust. In the first 
instance at least, regulators acting as ombudsmen act informally 
and within the organization. They often find in favor of the 
organization instead of the individual complainant. In those cases, 
the individual must, in the end, believe that the ombudsman 
operated with integrity. On the other hand, the ombudsman must 
have the respect of the system. The RTO must recognize that 
compliance with the ombudsman's decision is in the best interest of 
the organization, even when they believe that the decision was not 
balanced. 60 
While the function of ombudsmen is to "work out" differences, 
resolution of some controversies may ultimately require some 
coercive authority. Such dispute resolution does not seem to have 
been given much attention in RTO design except as between 
members.61 RTOs probably assume that an administrative process 
will address such disputes. The new role for state and local energy 
authorities should include consideration of the extent and nature of 
their adjudication of individual disputes with the RTOs and their 
members. One approach is for the governmental authorities to 
provide the forum for dispute resolution. Alternatively, the RTO 
could provide its own adjudicative process. While this might raise 
some superficial questions of impartiality, the dispute resolution 
process could be designed to assure independence from the RTO. 62 
The governmental authority then could provide independent 
advocates to complainants, who would not be part of the RTO's 
adjudicative entity. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We are well into the first generation of organizing the 
restructured electricity industry. The future no doubt holds 
obstacles and glitches. Nonetheless, some sound work has been 
done. System designers, both public and private, have moved us 
along in measured steps with due regard for the peculiarities of the 
industry. Justifiably, they have concentrated on managing the 
business. However, a system as pervasive and crucial to our society 
60. The ABA Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice has 
an ongoing ombudsman project from which guidance could be obtained. For a 
summary of both public and private ombudsman functions, see Mary Rowe & 
Dean M. Gottehrer, Similarities and Differences Between Public and Private 
Sector Ombudsmen, at http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/ombuds/ 
g&rsimilar.html (1997). 
61. PJM OA, supra note 17, § 16.5, at 53. 
62. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982). 
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as electricity must be acceptable to the whole community. Attention 
to principles of participation (real rather than apparent), 
accountability, and transparency will foster community satisfaction. 
But those features will also enhance the overall performance of the 
RTO-governing institutions. What economists call "rents" are as 
available from a dominant position in internal governance as from a 
dominant position in the market. Therefore, sound governing 
institutions are as important to efficiency as they are to fairness and 
acceptability. This Article has made some observations and 
recommendations for furthering the goals of collaborative 
governance. In the end, the message is that much more thinking 
and experimentation are necessary. There undoubtedly are many 
other issues that will need to be identified and addressed as best 
governance practices are implemented. The electricity system is too 
important and too complex to ignore the views of any interest, and 
this Article suggests some first steps in realizing the goal of 
ensuring both broad and effective representation of all affected 
interests. 
